HASIL RAPAT KEDUA SEKUTU DAN TENTARA RAKYAT (17 JANUARI 1946)

A further meeting was held at AFNEI Headquarters on 17 January 1946 to discuss the evacuation of APWI and the Japanese forces from the interior of Java.

Attended by :

• Brigadier N.D. Wingrove, Chief of Staff Allied Forces
• Colonel P.E. Crook, RAPWI Control Allied Forces
• Lieutnant Colonel C.W. Ridley, GSO (OPS) Allied Forces
• Mayor Jenderal Sudibyo, POPDA Chief of Markas Besar Tentara Rakyat Indonesia
• Letnan Kolonel Latif Hendraningrat, Staff Markas Besar Tentara Rakyat Indonesia
• Dr. Mangoendjojo, Representative of the Sultan of Yogyakarta
• Letnan Soetomo, Tentara Rakyat Indonesia

1.  As far as the evacuation of APWI was concerned the following decisions were made : (a) That the evacuation of APWI by TRI would proceed with the utmost dispatch. (b) That TRI would inform AFNEI at least 24 hours ahead of the date and time arrival of each train, and of the numbers of men, women and children in it, TRI stated that they hoped the first train reach Batavia within one week. (c) That as soon as possible TRI will send AFNEI Headquarters the total number of all APWI, by classes (i.e. men, women and children), who are awaiting evacuation from within Java. This, of course, excludes such number already under Allied protection. (d) That H.Q. RAPWI and H.Q. AFNEI would send a further list of places, which they had now received, where APWI were believed to be located.
2. The TRI representatices asked that the signed agreement should be given to them, by the Allies to the effect that no APWI would be armed and subsequently used to fight against their national cause. While this was noted it was pointed out by the Allies they already had a statement to this effect in minutes at the meeting held at H.Q. AFNEI on 9 January 1946, forwarded under H.Q. AFNEI No.40516 A GSO dated 10 January 1946, which was signed by the Brigadier General Staff AFNEI.
3. The TRI first stated that their difficulty in obtaining a sufficient sense of security at Semarang and Surabaya, to enable them to evacuate the Japanese to these places without considerable risk of restarting of serious trouble. They stated that they only way in which they could obtain sufficient security, was for the Allies, since they could not agree to the handing over parts of these two towns to TRI authority to allow a TRI force to enter these towns as TRI to co-operate with the Allies under Allied Command.
4. The Allies pointed out that under the orders of the United Nations they were the sole authority in such places as they found it necesary to the station troops. Therefore, although they fully appreciated the TRI difficulties, it was quite impossible for them to do anyrhing which would delegate this authority to anyone else. The only way thereforce, in which the TRI  could be allowed in these towns, should be as police to help the local Allied Command in maintaining law and order in camping areas. Whether they should be asked to do this or not was entirely a question of whether the local Allied Commander decided it was necessary or not. If they should be asked, then they would be in exactly the same position as TRI in Batavia. That would be the part of the Allied police force under command of the Allied Commander.
5. As a result od the discussion outlined in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, and since the TRI representatives considered this would not under present conditions, procure sufficient security it was decided that : (a) The question of evacuating Japanese would be left over until APWI had been evacuated so as to enable TRI to concentrate all their efforts on this most important APWI task. (b) As soon as APWI had been evacuated for the question of evacuating the Japanese forces would again be discussed, bu which time the situation in Java would probably be such as to make decision easier. (c) Meanwhile TRI would consider the problem and take such preliminary step, as the concentration of Japanese from outlaying areas to controlled concentration camps, as would facilitate their quick evacuation as soon as all APWI had been evacuated, and final decision arrived at.
6. Publicity. That no information of any kind would be given to the Press beyond the fact thet discussions were in progress, until actual result stated. A simultaneous release would then be made by both H.Q. AFNEI and TRI.